Two devastating world wars shaped the first half of the 20th century, leaving Europe and other parts of the world in ruins. Seven years after the end of the war, in 1952, France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries laid the crucial foundation for a new European beginning by founding the European Coal and Steel Community. This later evolved into the European Union in 1993 through the Maastricht Treaty. Today, the EU comprises 27 countries and is globally regarded as the most successful example of regional integration: EU citizens can travel through neighboring countries without a visa, work or live there, and member states benefit from close economic ties within the single market, along with numerous other advantages.

Given all these benefits, wouldn’t it seem far-fetched to reject the EU and return to fully sovereign nation-states? While many indeed consider this idea absurd, others still long for exactly that: the abolition of the EU. For several years now, criticism of the supranational organization has been growing: citizens complain about a democratic deficit and tend to identify more strongly with their national identity than as EU citizens. Many also criticize the EU as a project driven solely by elites, failing to adequately represent the interests of ordinary people. Within these critical voices, a clear divide emerges: social democratic, green, left-leaning parties, and much of the political center support the grand political project, while conservative and right-wing parties tend to take a Euroskeptic or outright hostile stance.

As an unprecedented supranational institution, the EU is a constant subject of political science research. At the Humboldt Governance Lab of Humboldt University in Berlin, the organization is also regularly examined. Professor Dr. Heike Klüver, head of the HGL and lecturer at HU, together with Dr. Asli Unan from the University of Amsterdam, studied how EU citizens’ attitudes toward the EU have been influenced by Russia’s war of aggression. For their research project, the scholars used data from the Eurobarometer, collected between February and April 2022 from over 26,000 EU citizens (aged 15 and older, representative sample). Thanks to the large sample size, the researchers were able—unlike other scholars who only captured public opinion in countries bordering Russia—to assess the war’s impact on citizens’ views across all EU member states.

So, what are the results of the study? They show that support for the EU among citizens has increased since the Russian invasion. On average, the war led to an increase of about 4 percent in support, which continued in the weeks following the invasion. Interestingly, support for the EU rose not only in states that border Russia and are therefore more directly threatened, but across all EU member states.

Thus, the study could be seen as evidence of the “rally around the flag” effect, where regional conflicts foster greater unity within supranational organizations. This is also supported by theories from social identity research, which suggest that external threats enhance group identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Hogg, 2016). In addition to a stronger identification as Europeans, more people now appear to view the EU as a vital security actor during times of conflict.

While overall support has increased, the study also notes a rise in critical voices from left-leaning citizens—traditionally among the EU’s core supporters—since the Russian-Ukrainian war. As a result of both developments, the ideological gap between left- and right-leaning Europeans has narrowed somewhat. Fundamentally, the researchers conclude that attitudes toward the EU are strongly influenced by political ideology and age, with the youngest age groups showing the highest levels of support.

Since public opinion is crucial for the survival of supranational organizations like the EU, it is particularly important to regularly examine EU citizens’ views. It appears that war on European soil has led to greater unity among the European population. People have realized that they benefit significantly from the EU in terms of security and may now be more inclined to identify with their status as EU citizens.

Read the full study here: Europeans’ attitudes toward the EU following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine | Political Science Research and Methods | Cambridge Core

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Der Beitrag Threat unites erschien zuerst auf Humboldt-Innovation Insights.

A recent study titled “The Youth Gender Gap in Support for the Far Right” (2025) conducted by researchers from Humboldt University Berlin – Ðorđe Milosav, Heike Klüver and others as Zachary Dickson, Sara B. Hobolt, Theresa Kuhn, and Toni Rodon – demonstrates a growing ideological divide between young men and women across Europe. The research highlights how this emerging political gender gap could shape the continent’s future.

By analyzing data from the 2024 European Election Studies (EES), which comprise data of approximately 25,000 voters across all 27 EU member states, the research team uncovered an unprecedented trend: far-right parties are gaining historically high levels of support among young voters aged 16 to 29. This marks a significant shift, as progressive parties have traditionally dominated youth voting blocs in European elections.

The study’s most striking finding reveals a pronounced gender disparity in far-right support. Among young voters, 21% of men endorse right-wing parties compared to just 14% of women in the same age group. This 7-point gender gap stems from fundamental differences in political attitudes, with young European women consistently exhibiting more progressive social views than their male counterparts.

Longitudinal analysis of European election data from 1989 to 2024 shows this gender gap is particularly acute among Millennials and Generation Z voters. While Baby Boomers show nearly identical political preferences across genders, younger generations display rapidly diverging political trajectories. Notably, the divide appears to widen faster within Generation Z as they age compared to previous generations.

The research underscores the lasting impact of early political socialization. As lead researcher Ðorđe Milosav explains: “Young people are very impressionable during their early years, and the habits they form during that time tend to stick with them. They grow up influenced by family, friends, school, and social media, and these settings shape the way they think and behave. So, when a young person votes for the first time, that experience can set a habitual pattern for the future, often influencing how they vote in later elections.” This phenomenon makes the 16-29 age range particularly crucial for understanding long-term political trends.

The study identifies several factors contributing to this emerging divide. Educational attainment, attitudes toward gender equality, and positions on social issues all correlate strongly with political preferences. Young voters with higher education levels and progressive social views show markedly lower support for far-right parties. Conversely, those prioritizing economic concerns over climate policy and expressing authoritarian leanings demonstrate greater affinity for right-wing platforms.

Interestingly, while general attitudes toward migration show limited correlation with far-right voting, support for restrictive immigration policies does predict right-wing preference. The researchers emphasize that these differences reflect broader value systems and socioeconomic conditions rather than gender alone.

The study engages with the concept of European Parliament elections as “second-order” contests, where voters often express dissatisfaction rather than make carefully considered choices. However, the researchers caution that these elections still hold substantial importance, as strong far-right performances can translate into increased support in subsequent national elections.

The research team warns that this growing political polarization could have profound social consequences. As ideological differences harden, they may manifest in personal relationships, potentially affecting dating patterns, marriage stability, and even birth rates. The study suggests that without intervention, these trends could exacerbate existing social fractures.

Addressing this divide will require multifaceted approaches. The researchers highlight the need to tackle underlying socioeconomic inequalities while reexamining contemporary conceptions of masculinity. They also stress the importance of political education and civic engagement initiatives targeted at young voters.

The full study is available through the Humboldt Governance Lab, directed by Professor Heike Klüver. The lab specializes in translating academic research into actionable insights for policymakers and civil society.

Study reference:
Milosav, Ð., Klüver, H., et al. (2025). The Youth Gender Gap in Support for the Far Right. Berlin: Humboldt Governance Lab. Full article: The youth gender gap in support for the far right

Der Beitrag Gender gap: Young men leaning more to the right? erschien zuerst auf Humboldt-Innovation Insights.