Right-wing parties are on the rise, in Europe as well as in the USA. And their political influence does not only begin upon entering government. In a recently published study, the Humboldt Governance Lab examines how the parliamentary presence of right-wing opposition parties affects government policy. The result is as clear as it is explosive: as soon as radical right-wing parties are represented in parliament, governments tighten their stance on migration.

Political scientists Heike Klüver and Fabio Ellger analyzed 165 coalition formations in 24 European democracies between 1980 and 2015. Using a unique dataset, they compared the discrepancies between parties’ election manifestos and the positions actually agreed upon in coalition agreements. This allowed them to precisely track when and where parties shift their political lines. The result: mainstream parties often adopt different positions in coalition agreements than those they advocated in their manifestos. According to the researchers, coalition negotiations offer the best time to shift positions, as these changes can be justified to citizens as necessary compromises. In this way, parties try to avoid being perceived as opportunistic by the electorate.

The study shows that established parties react strongly to changes in public mood. If support for right-wing parties grows, they adapt their policies in the hope of winning back lost voters. Right-wing parties, on the other hand, remain remarkably constant. They orient themselves toward their core electorate and stick to their positions.

The result is paradoxical and has significant political consequences: mainstream parties lose a substantial share of their votes in subsequent elections because they are perceived as lacking credibility. Right-wing parties, by contrast, benefit from their consistency and perform equally well or better. Adaptation thus proves to be a risky strategy. Minority governments that have already suffered losses in votes are particularly vulnerable to this dynamic. Interestingly, neither the size of right-wing parties nor the timing of their entry into parliament is decisive. Their mere presence is enough to trigger political shifts.

The study thus raises an uncomfortable question: should established parties resist the pressure and stick to their positions even in coalition negotiations to remain credible in the long term and take the wind out of right-wing parties’ sails? There is no simple answer. But one thing is clear: right-wing parties often change politics before they even govern.

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What effects do state-sponsored anti-LGBTQ measures have on voting behavior?
This question lies at the center of the new Humboldt GovLab study “The Electoral Effects of State-Sponsored Anti-LGBTQ Measures” (2025) by Violeta Ines Haas, Konstantin Bogatyrev, Tarik Abou-Chadi, Heike Klüver, and Lukas Stoetzer. Against the backdrop of the growing prevalence of anti-gender and anti-LGBTQ policies in many countries, the study addresses a dimension of these developments that has received little scholarly attention to date: their effects on individual electoral choices.

In countries such as Russia, Hungary, or Poland as well as in parts of the United States repressive anti-gender and anti-LGBTQ measures have become a common feature of political practice. Right-wing radical parties and religious groups in Western Europe and Latin America also increasingly oppose the LGBTQ movement. There are therefore strong reasons to examine more closely how these developments affect voting behavior.

While the cultural and institutional consequences of such rhetoric and policies have been extensively studied, far less is known about their political effects. To address this gap, the researchers from Humboldt GovLab and their partners employ a synthetic difference-in-differences design, a method particularly suited to estimating causal effects in quasi-experimental settings. The quasi-experiment underlying the study is the adoption of so-called “LGBT-free zones” by Polish municipalities. These resolutions were passed in some regions roughly seven months before the nationwide elections in 2019 and were actively promoted by the then-governing Law and Justice party (PiS).

The results show that voter turnout declined significantly in municipalities that adopted such resolutions. The drop was particularly pronounced among supporters of opposition parties. At the same time, PiS achieved higher vote shares in these municipalities. In geographically adjacent municipalities where no such resolutions were adopted, these patterns did not emerge. Regional factors can therefore be ruled out as an explanation for the observed electoral outcomes.

The authors conclude that anti-LGBTQ rhetoric and policies strengthen the electoral base of the parties that promote them. They trace these effects back to two central mechanisms. First, through anti-LGBTQ measures, political elites send normative signals that communicate which behaviors are socially desirable and which are not. This encourages citizens who already hold negative attitudes toward the LGBTQ community to express these views more openly, thereby mobilizing voters who support incumbent parties. Second, anti-LGBTQ measures shape perceptions of political efficacy. Citizens with hostile attitudes toward LGBTQ people experience state repression as confirmation of their political influence. By contrast, individuals with liberal values feel politically disempowered, leading to lower levels of electoral participation. This pattern was clearly evident in the 2019 Polish elections.

Overall, the study demonstrates that anti-LGBTQ rhetoric and policies have measurable effects on voting behavior. Supporters of such policies are more likely to turn out to vote, while opponents increasingly withdraw from the electoral process. The answer to the initial question is therefore clear: Yes, homophobia can contribute to electoral victory. The researchers therefore express concern that this dynamic may lead to a further increase in queer-hostile policies in the future.

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Over the past few decades, populist parties have been on the rise. While around the year 2000 they received only about 12% of the vote in European democracies, by 2018 they had already convinced 28% of voters across Europe.

But how can the ideology of these parties be defined? What is meant by populism remains a matter of debate among researchers. However, the definition proposed by populism scholar Cas Mudde has gained wide acceptance. From a populist perspective, society is divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: the “ordinary people” on one side and the elites on the other. The elites are seen as arrogant, lazy, irresponsible, and corrupt, while the ordinary people are viewed as innocent and at the mercy of the elites. According to populists, the general will of the people should be directly reflected in politics.

Political science research shows that support for parties with this populist ideology tends to be higher the greater the economic inequality within a society. In their new study, HU professors Heike Klüver and Johannes Giesike, along with Lukas F. Stötzer, professor at the University of Witten/Herdecke, have taken a closer look at this relationship, which has so far not been sufficiently explained. In addition to her professorship, Heike Klüver is the director of the Humboldt Governance Lab, of which Lukas F. Stötzer is also a member.

The researchers argue that it is not so much actual economic disparities that drive the rise of populism. Rather, the perception that society is unequal leads to the spread of populist attitudes and, consequently, to increased support for populist parties.

Perceptions of inequality can vary greatly between individuals and often do not align with the actual level of social inequality. People tend to underestimate how unequal their society really is. Nevertheless, there is a clear positive correlation between perceived and actual inequality.

The researchers’ study, which draws on data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), shows that support for populist parties is also linked to perceived inequality. Individuals who view society as more unjust are 2.7 percentage points more likely to vote for a populist party than those who consider their society relatively fair. The effects are particularly pronounced for major right-wing populist parties such as Norway’s Progress Party, the Danish People’s Party, and Austria’s Freedom Party.

With their study, the researchers make an important contribution to answering key political science questions about the rise of populism. In contrast to previous research, their findings show that the perception of society as unequal may be a crucial explanatory factor for the growing support of populist parties.

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In recent decades, right-wing populist parties have achieved success worldwide with anti-immigration campaigns, attracting many voters away from established mainstream parties. These parties now face the challenge of winning back their supporters.

Research has so far offered two common strategies for dealing with right-wing populist anti-immigration campaigns. On the one hand, established parties could adapt and adopt these issues themselves. However, this carries the risk of alienating remaining voters. On the other hand, they could try to suppress the issue and make it less prominent.

Researchers led by Prof. Dr. Heike Klüver from the Humboldt-Governance Lab have now investigated whether so-called “wedge issues” could represent a new strategy for mainstream parties. Wedge issues are issues that appeal to both pro-immigration and anti-immigration voters, thus taking into account the diverse interests of the electorate.

The research group tested this hypothesis with a panel survey experiment during the 2021 federal elections, focusing on the CDU/CSU. Through hypothetical election posters, the perceived agenda of the Union was manipulated to increase the importance of certain wedge issues.

The results of the study show that wedge issue strategies are not effective on average. However, exploratory analyses suggest that some anti-immigration voters could be won back through strategically targeted messages.

The research group emphasizes that wedge issue strategies could be particularly suitable for mainstream parties, which, unlike right-wing parties, cover a broad range of topics. Mainstream parties should therefore exploit “cracks” and “breaks” in the opposition’s electorate while strengthening their own base. This would allow them to win over supporters of right-wing parties as well as retain their core voters.

However, for these strategies to be successful, careful alignment of the wedge issues is crucial. “Through clearly formulated messages, there is potential to win back voter votes,” the researchers conclude.

The study by the Humboldt-Governance Lab thus offers new insights into the challenges and potential of voter recovery for mainstream parties. Whether wedge issues actually represent a promising strategy remains to be seen in the future.

Get read the study: Can wedge strategies by mainstream parties cross-cut the anti-immigration far right vote? – ScienceDirect

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Two devastating world wars shaped the first half of the 20th century, leaving Europe and other parts of the world in ruins. Seven years after the end of the war, in 1952, France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries laid the crucial foundation for a new European beginning by founding the European Coal and Steel Community. This later evolved into the European Union in 1993 through the Maastricht Treaty. Today, the EU comprises 27 countries and is globally regarded as the most successful example of regional integration: EU citizens can travel through neighboring countries without a visa, work or live there, and member states benefit from close economic ties within the single market, along with numerous other advantages.

Given all these benefits, wouldn’t it seem far-fetched to reject the EU and return to fully sovereign nation-states? While many indeed consider this idea absurd, others still long for exactly that: the abolition of the EU. For several years now, criticism of the supranational organization has been growing: citizens complain about a democratic deficit and tend to identify more strongly with their national identity than as EU citizens. Many also criticize the EU as a project driven solely by elites, failing to adequately represent the interests of ordinary people. Within these critical voices, a clear divide emerges: social democratic, green, left-leaning parties, and much of the political center support the grand political project, while conservative and right-wing parties tend to take a Euroskeptic or outright hostile stance.

As an unprecedented supranational institution, the EU is a constant subject of political science research. At the Humboldt Governance Lab of Humboldt University in Berlin, the organization is also regularly examined. Professor Dr. Heike Klüver, head of the HGL and lecturer at HU, together with Dr. Asli Unan from the University of Amsterdam, studied how EU citizens’ attitudes toward the EU have been influenced by Russia’s war of aggression. For their research project, the scholars used data from the Eurobarometer, collected between February and April 2022 from over 26,000 EU citizens (aged 15 and older, representative sample). Thanks to the large sample size, the researchers were able—unlike other scholars who only captured public opinion in countries bordering Russia—to assess the war’s impact on citizens’ views across all EU member states.

So, what are the results of the study? They show that support for the EU among citizens has increased since the Russian invasion. On average, the war led to an increase of about 4 percent in support, which continued in the weeks following the invasion. Interestingly, support for the EU rose not only in states that border Russia and are therefore more directly threatened, but across all EU member states.

Thus, the study could be seen as evidence of the “rally around the flag” effect, where regional conflicts foster greater unity within supranational organizations. This is also supported by theories from social identity research, which suggest that external threats enhance group identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Hogg, 2016). In addition to a stronger identification as Europeans, more people now appear to view the EU as a vital security actor during times of conflict.

While overall support has increased, the study also notes a rise in critical voices from left-leaning citizens—traditionally among the EU’s core supporters—since the Russian-Ukrainian war. As a result of both developments, the ideological gap between left- and right-leaning Europeans has narrowed somewhat. Fundamentally, the researchers conclude that attitudes toward the EU are strongly influenced by political ideology and age, with the youngest age groups showing the highest levels of support.

Since public opinion is crucial for the survival of supranational organizations like the EU, it is particularly important to regularly examine EU citizens’ views. It appears that war on European soil has led to greater unity among the European population. People have realized that they benefit significantly from the EU in terms of security and may now be more inclined to identify with their status as EU citizens.

Read the full study here: Europeans’ attitudes toward the EU following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine | Political Science Research and Methods | Cambridge Core

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A recent study titled “The Youth Gender Gap in Support for the Far Right” (2025) conducted by researchers from Humboldt University Berlin – Ðorđe Milosav, Heike Klüver and others as Zachary Dickson, Sara B. Hobolt, Theresa Kuhn, and Toni Rodon – demonstrates a growing ideological divide between young men and women across Europe. The research highlights how this emerging political gender gap could shape the continent’s future.

By analyzing data from the 2024 European Election Studies (EES), which comprise data of approximately 25,000 voters across all 27 EU member states, the research team uncovered an unprecedented trend: far-right parties are gaining historically high levels of support among young voters aged 16 to 29. This marks a significant shift, as progressive parties have traditionally dominated youth voting blocs in European elections.

The study’s most striking finding reveals a pronounced gender disparity in far-right support. Among young voters, 21% of men endorse right-wing parties compared to just 14% of women in the same age group. This 7-point gender gap stems from fundamental differences in political attitudes, with young European women consistently exhibiting more progressive social views than their male counterparts.

Longitudinal analysis of European election data from 1989 to 2024 shows this gender gap is particularly acute among Millennials and Generation Z voters. While Baby Boomers show nearly identical political preferences across genders, younger generations display rapidly diverging political trajectories. Notably, the divide appears to widen faster within Generation Z as they age compared to previous generations.

The research underscores the lasting impact of early political socialization. As lead researcher Ðorđe Milosav explains: “Young people are very impressionable during their early years, and the habits they form during that time tend to stick with them. They grow up influenced by family, friends, school, and social media, and these settings shape the way they think and behave. So, when a young person votes for the first time, that experience can set a habitual pattern for the future, often influencing how they vote in later elections.” This phenomenon makes the 16-29 age range particularly crucial for understanding long-term political trends.

The study identifies several factors contributing to this emerging divide. Educational attainment, attitudes toward gender equality, and positions on social issues all correlate strongly with political preferences. Young voters with higher education levels and progressive social views show markedly lower support for far-right parties. Conversely, those prioritizing economic concerns over climate policy and expressing authoritarian leanings demonstrate greater affinity for right-wing platforms.

Interestingly, while general attitudes toward migration show limited correlation with far-right voting, support for restrictive immigration policies does predict right-wing preference. The researchers emphasize that these differences reflect broader value systems and socioeconomic conditions rather than gender alone.

The study engages with the concept of European Parliament elections as “second-order” contests, where voters often express dissatisfaction rather than make carefully considered choices. However, the researchers caution that these elections still hold substantial importance, as strong far-right performances can translate into increased support in subsequent national elections.

The research team warns that this growing political polarization could have profound social consequences. As ideological differences harden, they may manifest in personal relationships, potentially affecting dating patterns, marriage stability, and even birth rates. The study suggests that without intervention, these trends could exacerbate existing social fractures.

Addressing this divide will require multifaceted approaches. The researchers highlight the need to tackle underlying socioeconomic inequalities while reexamining contemporary conceptions of masculinity. They also stress the importance of political education and civic engagement initiatives targeted at young voters.

The full study is available through the Humboldt Governance Lab, directed by Professor Heike Klüver. The lab specializes in translating academic research into actionable insights for policymakers and civil society.

Study reference:
Milosav, Ð., Klüver, H., et al. (2025). The Youth Gender Gap in Support for the Far Right. Berlin: Humboldt Governance Lab. Full article: The youth gender gap in support for the far right

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A 2021 study by researchers Heike Klüver, Johannes Giesecke, and Lukas Stoetzer, featured in the Humboldt Governance Lab, addresses the question of why Europe has been facing a rapid rise in right-wing populist parties for over a decade.

The research team led by Prof. Heike Klüver demonstrates that income inequality fosters the electoral success of populist parties in Europe. The growing income inequality in Europe over the past decades has significantly contributed to the success of populists who promote an antagonistic view of society, pitting “ordinary people” against the “corrupt elite,” and who aim to implement the direct will of the citizens.

Current examples include the FPÖ in Austria or the AfD in Germany. Such parties are particularly known for their scapegoating rhetoric, blaming the elite – specifically established parties – and, in the case of right-wing populist parties, non-European migrants and other marginalized groups, such as LGBTQ+ individuals, for societal problems.

Increasing income inequality significantly exacerbates societal problems, creating fertile ground for populist forces. These forces often respond to social tensions with simplistic, under-complex solutions, such as calls for the deportation of migrants, who are falsely portrayed as the cause of societal ills. In this way, they manage to win over insecure citizens or those with right-wing extremist tendencies.

According to the HU researchers, income inequality is closely linked to factors such as income insecurity, a lack of trust in political elites, and the extent of social integration. However, these elements only partially explain how income inequality can fuel the rise of (right-wing) populist forces.

A detailed review of existing studies shows that the respective influence of these factors on the success of (right-wing) populist movements is still not clearly determined. However, it has been found that citizens’ trust in political elites has a particularly strong influence on their likelihood of supporting populist parties.

This suggests that the link between income inequality and populism cannot be explained solely by economic factors. Instead, the scientific literature increasingly raises the question of whether cultural changes, such as shifts in societal values, might play an equally significant role in the rise of right-wing populist parties.

The Humboldt Governance Lab at Humboldt University Berlin was established by researchers to make the latest findings from political science accessible to the general public in an easily understandable way, thereby building bridges between science and politics as well as science and civil society.

A wide range of research projects on contemporary political phenomena are available on the platform at any time and provide valuable insights that can serve, for example, as decision-making tools for politicians.

Der Beitrag Income gap and populism erschien zuerst auf Humboldt-Innovation Insights.

The Humboldt-Governance Lab has three main tasks: Firstly, it makes current research findings accessible to decision-makers and journalists. The aim is to enrich political processes and debates with well-founded information. Secondly, the Lab promotes dialog between science, politics, business and civil society. It aims to facilitate the exchange of information on pressing social issues. Thirdly, the Lab works together with political actors to develop and review new political measures. This results in concrete, scientifically sound solutions for current challenges.

The public accessibility of research is a central concern of the Lab. Research results must not remain confined to the academic world; they should form the basis for political decisions and public debates. An informed society can lead to better political results. The Humboldt-Governance Lab aims to promote precisely this exchange.

There is still room for improvement in communication between science and the public in Germany.
The pandemic in particular has shown how important evidence-based information is – but also how dangerous misinformation can be.
“In the social sciences, the line between scientific findings and personal opinions sometimes becomes blurred,”

the founder points out. Here, science needs to communicate more clearly what is supported by empirical data and what remains personal interpretation. Misunderstandings in this area could otherwise lead to wrong political decisions.

Der Beitrag GovLab: Science for better politics erschien zuerst auf Humboldt-Innovation Insights.